58. Officer Faulkner's death and the charges against Mr. Jamal, a prominent black journalist and activist, sparked widespread media coverage and polarized Philadelphia. At the first pre-trial hearing, Judge Ribner commented: "I know there are certain cases that have explosive tendencies in this community, and this is one of them." (1/5/82, Tr. 66) Of approximately 80 jurors in the jury pool, all but seven prospective jurors were familiar with the media coverage of the case. (6/9/82, Tr. 105; 6/10/82, Tr. 4.19; 6/11/82, Tr. 5.19; 6/15/82, Tr. 19; 6/16/82, Tr. 378)

59. Faced with charges of killing a police officer, Mr. Jamal's efforts to prove his innocence were frustrated. Before trial, Mr. Jamal's counsel charged that the prosecution was hampering the defense by intimidating witnesses. (4/29/82, Tr. 14-15; 34) As discussed above, evidence revealed at trial and since confirms that the Commonwealth deliberately suppressed the true circumstances of the shooting by coercing and threatening witnesses and failing to disclose the use or results of polygraph and photo identifications. Although the court had previously granted the prosecution the right to photograph Mr. Jamal in the hospital and thus use the photographs to assist witnesses in their identification (D-1; 12/21/82), the court denied Mr. Jamal the right to a fair and non-suggestive line-up. (D-3; 1/5/82)

60. Mr. Jamal petitioned the court to appoint four experts - an investigator, photographer, pathologist and ballistician. (D-4 through D-7; 1/20/82) The court authorized Mr. Jamal to employ these experts, but allowed only $150 in expenses for each expert, and repeatedly refused to authorize any additional funds. (Id.; Jackson Aff. p 4, Exh. 1; 4/29/82, Tr. 10-11; 5/13/82, Tr. 16-18) Although police conducted over 100 witness interviews, the addresses and phone numbers of the witnesses were deleted from the interview reports provided to the defense. The deletion of this critical information made it virtually impossible to locate most of these witnesses. The court denied Mr. Jamal's requests for this additional information. (Jackson Aff. p 4, Exh. 1; see 4/29/82, Tr. 14-15)

61. On May 13, after his repeated requests for resources for assistance were denied, Mr. Jamal orally petitioned the court to be permitted to represent himself. (5/13/82, Tr. 53) The court immediately granted the request, and appointed Mr. Jackson as back-up counsel. Prior to the pre-trial hearing on Mr. Jamal's Motions to Suppress, Mr. Jamal restated his desire to represent himself. Mr. Jamal also advised the court that he did not want Mr. Jackson to serve as backup counsel and wanted to be assisted by one John Africa, a non-lawyer. The court permitted Mr. Jamal to represent himself, but denied the request for assistance by Mr. Africa, instead ordering Mr. Jackson to serve as backup counsel over Mr. Jamal's and Mr. Jackson's protests. (6/1/82, Tr. 2-38)

62. Mr. Jamal served as his own counsel in the Motion to Suppress hearing, in which he questioned fifteen witnesses. Mr. Jamal also served as counsel during the first two days of jury selection, without incident. He questioned 23 venire members, successfully challenging two for cause, defeating a government challenge for cause, and also exercising three peremptory challenges. (6/7/82, Tr. 149, 163, 174; 6/8/82, Tr. 46, 56, 69, 136)

63. At the start of the third day of voir dire, the court precipitously ruled that Mr. Jamal had to turn voir dire over to Mr. Jackson, or the court would take it over. (6/9/82 Tr. 18) Mr. Jamal refused to waive his right to sekf-representation, and the court took over voir dire. (Id. 3.19) When Mr. Jamal and Mr. Jackson refused to provide the court with proposed questions, the court held Mr. Jackson in contempt and sentenced Mr. Jackson to 6 months imprisonment. (Id. 22) Then, under protest, Mr. Jamal gave in and agreed to have Mr. Jackson conduct voir dire on his behalf. (Id. 105-08)

64. During the next several days, Mr. Jamal raised objections to the court's rulings, requesting to have his pro se rights restored and to have John Africa assist him at counsel table. (6/11/82, Tr. 199; 6/16/82, Tr. 498; 6/17/82, Tr. 48-60) Ultimately, the court suggested that Mr. Jackson make an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court for guidance on the question of his role in the case. (6/17/82, Tr. 116) Mr. Jackson stated that he could not appeal because Mr. Jamal was still counsel of record. (Id. 118) The court stated: "Well, if you're asking me to remove him, I'll remove him. I'll make it easy for you." (Id.) Ultimately the Supreme Court denied Mr. Jackson's appeal to permit Mr. Jamal to represent himself, to remove Mr. Jackson as backup counsel, and to permit John Africa to assist Mr. Jamal.

65. When proceedings next resumed in open court, Mr. Jamal spoke to protest the denial of his right to self representation. The court thereupon ordered that Mr. Jamal be removed from the courtroom. (Id. 2.90-91)

66. During the course of jury selection, the prosecution used eleven peremptory challenges to excuse black jurors. The resulting jury included only three black jurors. One of these was removed, outside Mr. Jamal's presence and without his knowledge, to be replaced by a white alternate juror. This black juror, Jeannie Dawley, was the only juror to be selected during the period when Mr. Jamal was allowed to conduct voir dire on his own behalf. (6/7/82, Tr. 187) The white alternate who replaced Ms. Dawley, Robert Courchain, had stated his bias against Mr. Jamal. (6/16/82, Tr. 393-95)

67. Mr. Jamal will prove that at least three white jurors, including the juror that ultimately selected as foreman, formed a grouping which met and deliberated throughout the trial, apart from the black jurors. (Hawkins Aff., Exh. 10)

68. Although Mr. Jamal sought to represent himself and had prepared the defense case for trial, he was not even present for large portions of the trial because the court repeatedly ordered his exclusion. (See Point VI, infra) During these periods of exclusion, the court did not provide Mr. Jamal any means to monitor the proceedings or to consult with Mr. Jackson while court was in session.

69. Because Mr. Jamal was precipitously denied his right to self-representation, his unwanted backup counsel, Mr. Jackson, was thrust into the role of trial counsel against his own wishes, without adequate preparation. He even failed to interview defense witnesses before they took the witness stand. (6/29/82, Tr. 137; Jackson Aff. p 5, Exh. 1)

70. In addition to Mr. Jackson's ineffective performance, the court's rulings precluded Mr. Jamal from presenting a defense. As discussed, supra, the officer who was with Mr. Jamal from the time of his arrest until his hospital treatment began stated in a police interview that Mr. Jamal made no comments. The trial court refused to grant a continuance to permit the witness to be located and testify. (Id. 46-48)

71. The court also excluded Veronica Jones' testimony that Sixth District police had offered to allow her to avoid arrest if she would testify that she saw Mr. Jamal shoot the officer intentionally, and that police told her a similar deal had been struck by Cynthia White. (6/29/82, Tr. 129-35) Further, the court refused to allow Mr. Jamal to show that Commonwealth witness Chobert had been convicted of committing arson for hire and was on probation for that offense. (6/19/82, Tr. 216-23)

72. In protest if the court's rulings denying his rights to represent himself, to select a jury of his peers, and to face and examine witnesses, Mr. Jamal refused to take the stand to testify in his defense.(7/1/82, Tr. 41)

73. In closing argument, the prosecutor ridiculed Mr. Jamal's efforts to assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and effective assistance of counsel of his choice. (7/1/82, Tr. 147-48) The prosecutor also made veiled negative references to Mr. Jamal's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Id. 172) The prosecutor vouched for witness Robert Chobert, and falsely stated that there was no evidence Mr. Chobert had a motive to lie, even though the prosecutor had caused the exclusion of evidence Mr. Chobert was on probation and therefore had such a motive. (Id. 182-83) The prosecution also referred to evidence not in the record to bolster the testimony of Priscilla Durham. (Id. 173) Finally, the prosecutor asked the jury in this high profile case which had polarized the city to convict Mr. Jamal because the people of Philadelphia demanded it. (Id. 172, 187)

74. The jury was charged and began deliberations on July 2, 1982, the Friday of the July 4 weekend. During the day, the jury requested to be reinstructed on the elements of first and third degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. (7/2/82, Tr. 54) The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first degree of murder and possession counts. (Id. 68-69)

75. On the following day, the Saturday of the July 4th weekend, the jury heard evidence regarding the penalty. Mr. Jackson made no attempt to prepare for the penalty phase hearing. (Jackson Aff. p 7, Exh.1) At the beginning of the defense evidence, the court permitted Mr. Jamal to make a statement to the jury that he was innocent, and to protest the denial of his rights throughout the trial. (7/3/82, Tr. 10-16)

76. Then the court permitted the prosecutor to "cross-examine" Mr. Jamal on his jury statement. The prosecutor, over objection, asked questions regarding Mr. Jamal's courtroom behavior such as: "What is the reason you did not stand when Judge Sabo came into the courtroom?"(7/3/82, Tr. 20) He went on to question Mr. Jamal's teenage political views as a member of the Black Panther Party in the 1960's. (Id. 21-23)

77. In summation, the prosecutor, over numerous objections, exploited this improper line of cross-examination to argue that Mr. Jamal's political history and confrontations with the court justified a death sentence. (Id. 66-70) Over objection, the prosecution falsely suggested that the jury would not be responsible for the sentence because it would ultimately be decided on appeal. (Id. 71-72) The prosecution further violated Mr. Jamal's Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Id. 59-60)

78. The legal grounds upon which relief is requested are as follows:

Trial Errors

I. The Commonwealth witheld materially favorable evidence from the defense, and knowingly used false evidence, all of which rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The evidence withheld (???)e false evidence used include the following:

(1) Statements by an eyewitness indicating that another individual, not Mr. Jamal, was the shooter, that the actual shooter fled the scene, and that a critical prosecution eyewitness was actually not present at the scene;

(2) evidence of the failure of a prosecution eyewitness to identify Mr. Jamal in a photo array;

(3) the favorable results of a polygraph examination administered to an eyewitness called by the defense which corroborated the claim that the actual shooter fled the scene;

(4) extensive police files concerning Mr. Jamal's political activities and affiliations which expose law enforcement's deep-seated bias against him and show that Mr. Jamal engaged in no criminal conduct during the years he was closely surveilled;

(5) evidence of intimidation, special deals and favors, and coercion which was applied to numerous witnesses, causing one eyewitness to flee the jurisdiction, causing Cynthia White to give false testimony, causing two eyewitnesses to retract their claim that they saw the shooter flee, and causing a police officer witness to take an unauthorized vacation in order to prevent his availability at trial; and

(6) evidence of incompetency in the Medical Examiner's autopsy report.

II. The court deprived Mr. Jamal of his fundamental right to present a defense in the following ways:

(1) Mr. Jamal was effectively barred from presenting crucial evidence that he had not made any inculpatory statements. Consequently, the prosecution's claim that Mr. Jamal had confessed to the shooting of Officer Faulkner - a confession that on its own terms is suspect - remained unrebutted.

(2) Mr. Jamal was barred from examining Veronica Jones and showing that prosecution witness Cynthia White - perhaps the most critical eyewitness for the prosecution - was coaxed and coerced to testify.

(3) Mr. Jamal was prevented from showing that another prosecution witness was susceptible to police pressure to change his account of events because he was on probation and because of prior drunk driving convictions.

(4) Because of his indigence and the court's unwillingness to authorize funding for investigation and expert witnesses, Mr. Jamal was unable to present expert testimony which would have established that the prosecution's theories were false.

The cumulative effect of the court's actions was to undermine the adversarial process to such an egregious degree that the resulting conviction was stripped of any modicum of reliability.

III. The court impermissably held two in camera conferences outside Mr. Jamal's presence, at a time when Mr. Jamal's pro se status was still intact, wherein Mr. Jamal's pro se status was discussed, an African-American juror selected by Mr. Jamal was removed, a question of juror taint was explored, and the admissibility of certain police officer testimony was considered.

IV. The conflicts between Mr. Jamal and his court-appointed attorney were so pervasive, divisive, and intense that his right to effective assistance of counsel must be presumed to have been violated; and further, that these conflicts in fact led to a constitutionally inadequate defense.

V. The court prematurely and unjustifiably stripped Mr. Jamal of his right to proceed as his own attorney, and instead imposed upon him a constitutionally ineffective attorney.

VI. The court unjustifiably banished Mr. Jamal on numerous occasions from the trial proceedings, thereby violating his right to self representation, his right to be present at his own trial, his right to assist in his own defense and his right to confront the prosecution's witnesses.

VII. The prosecutor's guilt-phase closing argument exceeded the bounds of propriety and violated Mr. Jamal's right to due process.

VIII. The court impermissably responded to a juror's inquiry, which ultimately led to that juror's removal, without notifying the defense of that inquiry.

IX. New evidence establishes that intentional racial discrimination infected the selection of the jury.

X. The jury pool from which the jury was selected was not a product of a random cross-section of the community.

XI. Certain jurors engaged in discussions of the evidence which were tantamount to deliberations before the conclusion of the case.

Sentencing Errors

XII. The Pennsylvania death penalty is unconstitutional because it is applied disparately, unequally, arbitrarily, and freakishly.

XIII. The sentencing verdict form created substantial probability that jurors believed that unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstance.

XIV. The prosecutor's summation in the sentencing phase diminished the jury's responsibility in determining whether death was an appropriate sentence, burdened defendant's right to silence, and exploited defendant's difficulties with the court and his own attorney over his pro se status.

XV. Mr. Jamal received the death sentence as a direct result of defense counsel's wholesale failure to prepare for the penalty phase, and his failure to present evidence in mitigation during that phase of the proceedings.

XVI. The prosecutor's use of and argument from evidence of Mr. Jamal's irrelevant political past and abstract ideas violated Mr. Jamal's constitutional rights.

XVII. The jury was not advised that a sentence of life carried with it no possibility of parole, violating Mr. Jamal's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

XVIII. The ineffective assistance of Mr. Jamal's appellate counsel prevented appellate review of meritorious issues based on the record.

XIX. The cumulative impact of the above errors deprived Mr. Jamal of due process.

79. Mr. Jamal raised the following issues on direct appeal:

i. the exclusion of jurors by race;

ii. the trial court's refusal to excuse a manifestly biased juror for cause;

iii. the trial court's abuse of discretion in assuming control over the voir dire;

iv. the inadequacy of funds to mount a minimally effective defense;

v. the impermissible cross-examination of a defense character witness;

vi.the prosecutor's reference in closing argument at both the guilt and penalty phases regarding Mr. Jamal's right to appeal;

vii. the prosecutor's penalty phase cross-examination of Mr. Jamal regarding his Black Panther affiliation and statements attributed to him in a newspaper publication;

viii. the imposition of the death penalty as disproportionate to the crime.

80. The issues raised herein as grounds for collateral relief are all of constitutional dimensions and would justify relief under the applicable federal habeas corpus statutes. The issues in part involve exculpatory evidence unavailable at trial that has subsequently become available and that would have affected the outcome of the trial if introduced. The errors at trial raised as grounds for collateral relief in this Petition so undermine the truth-determination process and the fundamental integrity of the adversarial process, that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence or reliable sentencing determination could have taken place.

81. With the exception of issues enumerated above as items IX and XVI, the issues raised herein as grounds for collateral relief were not presented for direct appellate review, but are raised here for the first time. Mr. Jamal did not knowingly and willfully forego presentation of these issues on direct appeal. The failure to raise these issues on direct appeal was the result of per se ineffective assistance of appellate counsel inasmuch as appellate counsel did not read the record in this case. (Hawkins Aff., Exh. 11)

82. The allegations of error presented herein have not been waived. To the extent any allegation of error is deemed waived, any such waiver has resulted in the conviction and-or affirmance of sentence of an innocent individual; and, further, any such waiver does not constitute a state procedural default barring federal habeas corpus relief.

[Paras 83-164 of this petition are not included.] WHEREFORE, petitioner Jamal requests this Court to:

1. Vacate the conviction and sentence of death; 2. Order a new trial; 3. Stay Mr. Jamal's execution; 4. Permit further investigation into the circumstances of Mr. Jamal's conviction, and if necessary, to permit the filing of an amended petition; 5. Grant the discovery motion filed herewith; 6. Grant a protective order to prevent the Commonwealth from harassing, inducing, intimidating, or coercing potential witnesses, experts or investigators in this matter, or otherwise communicating with such witnesses about this case, without prior notice to and the presence of Mr. Jamal's counsel. 7. Direct the Commonwealth to file the complete record of the prior proceedings, including any portions not presently transcribed; 8. In the alternative, direct that a hearing be held in order that all factual issues raised herein can be fully and fairly litigated.